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A New Paradigm in International Relations: A Reduction of
War and Terror in the World through Democratization and
Deterrence
John Norton Moore*
Thanks to McGeorge for this opportunity to share some of the research that I
have been doing, initially at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and then over the last
decade at the University of Virginia. This presentation will provide an overview
of the latest information on war and violent conflict.
While gathering and analyzing the data over the last decade, I have started to
realize the broader implications my research has for all the principal issues in
foreign affairs. Indeed, it is actually leading to a new paradigm in international
relations.
Right now we are focused on September 11th, but we should place this in
some perspective. As terrible as September 11th was, the casualties of World
War I were the equivalent of two September 11 th attacks every day for three and
one-quarter years. This gives you a sense of how important it is to avoid a major
war.

We will start with what we generally know about the causes of war. There is
a short list of some of the major things that we hear over and over about the
causes of war. Certainly, there are specific disputes among nations; ideological
disputes; ethnic and religious differences; proliferation of weapons and arms
races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of power; competition for
resources; incidents; accidents; and miscalculation. The old Marxists believed
that wars were caused by economic determinism. There are many other theories,
but what do we really know about the causes of war? The answer is that nothing
on the list of the most important traditional causes of war powerfully correlates
with war.
If we look from the opposite perspective there is another list, which in many
respects builds on the causes of war list described above. That is to say, looking
at traditional approaches for avoidance of war rather than causes of war, there are
a number of mechanisms including, diplomacy, balance of power, third party
dispute settlement, collective security, arms control, and resolving underlying
causes. However, once again, the point is that there is nothing on this list that we
know to have a robust correlation with wars.
This is not to suggest that these approaches are not important. They are
collectively an important part of the human arsenal for dealing with war and
conflict. For example, if we want to focus on the issue of weapons of mass
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destruction, it would be an error not to focus on the importance of arms control.
However, these approaches, by themselves, are not the answer to understanding
war. Rather, the most important empirical correlation found to date, which is
quite robust, is the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, wage war against
other democracies. This finding is called the Democratic Peace. According to
Bruce Russett, the Chairman of the International Relations Department at Yale,
"A striking fact about the world comes to bear on any discussion about
international relations ... [when we consider that] democracies have almost
never fought each other."
Another powerful correlation we know about, which is almost as powerful as
the Democratic Peace, is that a high level of bilateral trade between two countries
substantially reduces the risk of major war between those countries. There are a
few other minor but significant correlations that fit into the broader approaches,
but the Democratic Peace and bilateral trade are the two most important. Thus,
Rudy Rummel, who was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize a few years ago
found that in wars between 1816 and 1991, democracies versus democracies
scored zero wars, while non-democracies versus non-democracies were fighting
each other at a fairly robust rate with 198 of those countries having had major
wars.
Notwithstanding the compelling data, there are some remaining puzzles
about war. It is clear that simply being a democracy does not prevent that country
from engaging in warfare. For example, the United States is a democracy and it
has still been involved in a lot of wars. In other words, the data shows that
democracies do not fight democracies, but they are still involved in a large
number of wars. So what are the mechanisms within democracies that account
for the Democratic Peace? Are democracies as aggressive as non-democracies?
The pathways that lead democracies to war become an important place to focus
attention. How can democracies avoid wars with non-democracies? Or, if we ask
the question in light of today's reality, how can democracies avoid September
lth type problems triggered by terrorist groups. The answer is found in a
combination of democratic characteristics that ultimately account for the
Democratic Peace. In democracies there is a system of checks and balances. For
example, in a democratic system leaders are not chosen by violence, but rather,
they are chosen for their ability to appeal to a mass audience. This process is in
sharp contrast with non-democratic systems where people like Saddam Hussein
can rise to power as the violent enforcer for a political party, but when left
unchecked, such a person is able to kill the bosses and take over the political
machinery. Democracies also have a high level of interaction with other
democracies. This is where high levels of bilateral trade fit into the equation. The

1. Since we do not have time for complex explanations, we are going to use a very simple set of
definitions. The term "major war" is used to define wars with 1,000 casualties or more. Different scholars have
used very different definitions of "democracy," but rather interestingly, all of them have reached the same
conclusions.
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most important causation factor explaining the democratic peace, however, is
public choice theory. Leaders of democracies have far less ability to externalize
the cost of failure. Non-democratic leaders have almost unfettered ability to
internalize all the benefits of international aggression while externalizing the cost
of potential harm upon their populations. Thus, non-democratic leaders are far
more disposed to high-risk aggressive actions risking major war and other
disasters. This theory won the Nobel Prize in Economics several years ago and is
increasingly used in economic theory. Democracies are far less aggressive in
initiating major coercion than non-democracies. That is, with respect to the
"Democratic Peace," there is a. striking correlation between levels of
aggressiveness and government structure.
Our most recent research about war responsibility is contrary to the
prevailing view within international relations today. Since the adoption of the
United Nations Charter in 1945, at least 89 percent of major wars have been
initiated by non-democracies. These include a total of 28 major wars, including
Afghanistan, in the post-Charter era. Out of these major wars, there were two
with arguably democratic aggressors-Turkey's incursion in Cyprus and India's
incursion in Bangladesh. However, these two examples are debatable because
Turkey and India may not have been aggressors. The only example of a major
war with a clear democratic aggressor in the post-Charter era is when the British
and French went into Suez in 1956. This was condemned by the United States as
a violation of international law. Israel's participation in that action was not
considered democratic aggression because its action was in response to guerilla
attacks against Israel.
Examining all the casualties in the 28 major wars provides even more
compelling data. Wars initiated by the non-democracies since 1945 account for
99.6 percent of the total casualties resulting in over three million total human
casualties. Wars initiated by democracies total 13,365 casualties or .04 percent.
In contrast, this is a staggering difference.
There is, however, another side of the war prevention equation, the role of
deterrence. Deterrence is all the external consequences factoring into a decision
of whether to go to war. Here we are talking about the broadest conception of
deterrence. Deterrence includes a totality of positive and negative actions, such
as potential military responses, economic relations, diplomatic relations,
international organization or lack thereof, international law, alliances, and
collective security. On the Democratic Peace side of the equation, there are very
powerful statistical models based on major wars since 1816. The deterrence side
of the equation is lacking an equivalent empirical database. We do not have that
kind of empirical evidence on the deterrence side of the equation. Nevertheless,
there are a number of sources suggesting that deterrence plays a significant role.
Donald Kagan, one of the top historians in the United States, examined a variety
of wars starting with the Peloponnesian war. Kagan concluded that all of those
wars were avoidable if there had been appropriate deterrence.
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Part of our research analyzed the level of deterrence in all the major wars
since the United Nations Charter. We concluded that every single war could have
been avoided if there had been appropriate levels of deterrence.
To summarize, democracies rarely go to war against other democracies.
Democracies have engaged in wars against non-democracies, but the major wars
were principally initiated by non-democracies. Democracies are likely to be far
less aggressive in settings that require major coercion, or that run the risk of
turning into a high casualty war. On the other side of the equation, effective
deterrence can prevent war. Thus, we can formulate a new paradigm in
international relations based on an understanding that major war is a synergy
between aggressive, predominantly non-democratic regimes, and an absence of
effective deterrence. I would suggest to you that this is also precisely the synergy
that generated the September 11 th tragedy.
Now, we need some techniques for testing this hypothesis.
We can begin to test the hypothesis by asking a series of questions. Is the
hypothesis consistent with major wars? Is it consistent with non-war settings?
What happens when the levels of deterrence dramatically increase or decrease?
Do you see a major change?
If, after asking these questions, we discover that government structure is one
of the most important elements in the origins of war, we should also test that
conclusion against all other major foreign policy goals. In other words, test the
conclusion in other foreign policy settings such as human rights, economic
development, environmental protection, famine avoidance, avoidance of
terrorism and avoidance of corruption. If we find that there is a high correlation
in those settings, too, it will give us some confidence that we are holding the
right answers. More significantly, it will tell us that we are dealing not just with a
theory of war and peace, but also with a broader theory of international relations.
To test the hypothesis, we look for consistency with major wars such as,
World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Indo-China war, the Iran-Iraq
war, the Gulf War and the War Against Terrorism. For our purposes, I will focus
on World War I and the War Against Terrorism.
World War I has been described as a war that started by accident, that no one
really wanted, or a war that occurred because of a tightening system of alliances.
These explanations are false.2 Those elements were there, but they were, at least
in part, not the cause of World War I. Rather, World War I fits the synergy
perfectly. There was a non-democratic regime, and an absence of effective
deterrence. Contrary to what is typically thought, the war started on the eastern
front, and not the western front. It started when Germany convinced Austria to
attack Serbia, using the excuse of the so-called "Black Hand terrorist group's"

2. In Germany 15 years ago, there was a huge debate between the establishment and a young historian
named Fritz Fisher. Fisher claimed that Germany was responsible for World War I. There was a 15-year debate,
and in the end Fisher won that debate and today in Germany, unlike the United States, Germans are taught that
Germany was the aggressor in World War I.
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assassination of the Arch Duke. Yet, Germany and Austria knew, based on their
intelligence services that Serbia had nothing to do with the assassination.
Nevertheless, it was decided that the incident should be used to annex the rest of
Serbia. Indeed, on close examination the Austrian Foreign Minister is the
principal villain of World War I.
On the other side of the equation, there was an absence of effective
deterrence. For example, the British refused to give any kind of guarantee to the
French, the Russians, or others that it would enter the war.' In fact, the German
Kaiser was shocked when Great Britain entered the war. Moreover, the Germans
perceived the French as militarily weak. And at that time, the United States had
only one division of soldiers who were training with wooden rifles. The United
States was irrelevant to the initial decision.
With respect to the War Against Terrorism, we certainly have a nondemocratic aggressor. Specifically, we are dealing with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden, and their extraordinary interconnection with non-democratic regimes like
the Taliban government of Afghanistan.
There is also an absence of effective deterrence. In the 1970s, as Counselor
on International Law for the U.S. State Department, I was asked to draft the U.S.
treaty to respond against terrorism in the aftermath of the Munich massacre. I can
remember trying to sell that perfectly good treaty to the United Nations' General
Assembly. The climate on deterrence against terrorism had been incredibly weak
for 50 years. It is hard to imagine how weak the climate against terrorism truly
was in the world before September 11th. Specifically, there was a history of
weak responses to Al-Qaeda attacks against the United States. First, there was the
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. In 1996, Osama bin Laden actually
issued a declaration of war against the United States. This was followed by the
Covar Towers' bombing in 1996. There were also the embassy attacks in Nairobi
and Dar Es Salam. Finally, there was the attack on the USS Cole, which garnered
no response.
Next, we ask if our hypothesis is consistent with non-war settings. These are
the proverbial dogs that never barked. In these cases, how was major war
avoided? What prevented certain events from triggering World War III? The
answer is that even though there were aggressive regimes on one side, there was
also a very effective system of deterrence in the form of NATO. I personally
believe formation of NATO may well be the policy that prevented World War
III.
There are also a number of strong democracies that have curtailed the
number of wars. For example, the United States and Canada are two democracies
that share a border without a conflict that has escalated into major war. France
and Switzerland are both strong democracies in close proximity and yet no one

3. Today, NATO guarantees that all members would be obligated to defend another member if such
aggression occurred.
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worries about a war between them. No one worries about nuclear attack from the
French or the British even though both could take out all of the major American
cities. Why not worry? The United States is not worried because it knows
perfectly well that France and Great Britain are democracies and they are not
about to attack another democracy like the United States.
In conclusion, I believe there is compelling evidence to support a new
paradigm in international relations. We can see that major war is predominately a
synergy between aggressive non-democracies and an absence of effective
deterrence. Therefore, to reduce war and terror in the world we must work to
develop democracies and impose effective deterrence to deal with aggressive
regimes. To this, terrorism adds an additional requirement. We must work to
rebut radical ideas to reduce the pool of recruits ideologically committed to terror
against us.

